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Abstract 
In his Wealth of Nations (1776) Adam Smith created an agenda for the study of the economy 
that is reflected in the structure of modern economics. This paper describes Smith’s 
contributions to four central areas of economic theory: The theory of price formation, the 
relationship between market outcomes and the public interest, the role of the state in the 
economy, and the sources of economic growth. In each case, an attempt is made to relate 
Smith’s contribution to the state of contemporary economics, showing both the similarities 
and contrasts between the respective approaches.  
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In his 1776 book An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (WN for 
short) Adam Smith created an agenda for economic theory whose outline can still be seen in 
the structure of modern economics. Some central areas in which this is particularly true are 
his theory of price formation, his ideas about the relationship between the market economy 
and the public interest, his reflections on the role of the state, and his analysis of the sources 
of economic growth. The present essay describes the core of his contributions to these areas 
and tries to relate them to the state of economics as it has developed in particular over the last 
fifty years.  
Price theory 
Smith begins his analysis of the determination of the relative prices of goods and services 
with a story of price formation in a primitive society of hunters. The point of the example was 
obviously not to present a theory that could immediately be applied to contemporary 
economic conditions, but to construct a pedagogical case that would lead the reader to 
understand more complicated issues. In this society hunters aim to kill beavers and deer, both 
of which animals are desired by consumers. If it takes twice as many hours to kill a beaver 
than to kill a deer, it follows, Smith argues, that the price of a beaver will be twice that of a 
deer. Since the prices are determined exclusively by the labor time of the hunters, this is a 
clear and simple illustration of what became known as the labor theory of value. 
The modern reader, accustomed to think of price formation in terms of the joint effects of 
supply and demand, may be puzzled by the neglect of the demand side in this example. Is 
demand irrelevant for the understanding of prices? In fact, demand does play a role in the 
determination of the market outcome, but given the simple assumptions made about costs, the 
role of demand is solely that of determining quantities, i.e. the number of beavers and deer 
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that are actually caught and brought to the market. Costs determine prices, demand determines 
quantities. 
Smith generalized the example to the case where costs have more components than simply 
labor time. If costs also include necessary expenditure on weapons and the possible costs 
related to the use of the land, the total costs of production have three components that reflect 
the payment to the three factors of production, labor, capital and land. When all three factors 
earn their normal reward, this defines the “natural price” of the commodity in question. With 
this extension, Smith’s original labor theory of value became a more general cost of 
production theory of value. However, in the real world the actual market price may deviate 
from the natural price, as in his celebrated example of a public mourning. The death of a king 
increases the demand for black cloth, but since the supply of cloth in the short run is a given 
quantity, the effect of the rise in demand is to push up the price. In the longer run, the fact that 
the market price is above the natural price may lead to the entry of additional suppliers who 
are attracted to the market by the prospect of earning more than the normal reward to their 
resources. Moreover, once the period of public mourning has come to an end, demand 
diminishes and the price falls back to its normal level. This is the normal operation of a free 
market. However, there are other reasons why the market price may stay above its normal 
level, the most important of which is a public monopoly that has been established because the 
government has combined the privilege of exclusive rights of production with the prohibition 
of entry by other firms. While the competitive price – the price under “the system of perfect 
liberty” – is “the lowest which the sellers can commonly afford to take, and at the same time 
continue their business”, the monopoly price is “the highest that can be squeezed out of the 
buyers, or which, it is supposed, they will consent to give.” (WN, pp. 78-79.)i 
To a large extent, Smith’s reasoning is well in line with modern analysis of competition and 
monopoly. The distinction between the natural and market price corresponds to the modern 
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distinction between the long-run and short-run equilibrium price under perfect competition, 
where the cost-based constancy of the long-run equilibrium price is the result of the twin 
assumptions of constant returns to scale for the industry as a whole and free entryii. Thus, the 
modern notion of the long-run equilibrium price is essentially equivalent to Smith’s natural 
price, and deviations of the market price from its long-run equilibrium are explained by the 
modern economist in terms that are essentially similar to Smith’s discussion of the example of 
public mourning. 
But there are also aspects of Smith’s analysis that are unsatisfactory. His characterization of 
the equilibrium price under monopoly is loose and suffers from the lack of an explicit analysis 
of profit maximization. There is also a notable lack of a general equilibrium perspective when 
he seems to consider the natural price as caused by the normal rewards to the factors of 
production instead of – as in modern theory – regarding both commodity and factor prices as 
being jointly determined by preferences, technology and market structure.  
The system of perfect liberty and monopoly are the limiting cases of competition. What about 
the cases in between, referred to by later economists as imperfect competition? On this point, 
there is some ambivalence in Smith’s writing. On the one hand, he sometimes expresses 
himself as if effective competition simply means the absence of monopoly, and the crucial 
condition for the existence of effective competition is free entry. If an existing monopoly 
position can be challenged by new entrants it is simply not viable, and competition will reign 
in the long run. But he also admits that even a fairly large number of producers may not be a 
guarantee of effective competition. A famous passage in the Wealth of Nations argues that 
“people of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the publick, or in some contrivance to raise prices.” 
(WN, p. 145.) The fundamental insight that producers have individual incentives to deviate 
5 
 
from the competitive conditions for their own benefit underlies modern ideas of competition 
policy, designed to uphold effective competition in the interests of society as a whole.  
What is it that makes such conspiracies against the public likely to occur? Smith points to the 
role played by the number of producers, and his argument, remarkably, is not the simple and 
mechanistic one that as the number of producers grows large, each of them will take the 
market price as given. If trade in a town is divided between two grocers instead of being in the 
hands of just one, this will make both of them sell cheaper. Suppose now that it is divided 
between twenty. Then “their competition would be just so much the greater, and their chance 
of combining together, in order to raise the price, so much the less” (WN, p. 361, my 
emphasis). This line of analysis bears a striking resemblance to the modern game-theoretic 
analysis of the core which points out that as the number of competitors increases, the 
difficulty of forming coalitions which cannot be challenged by other coalitions increases until 
the only equilibrium outcome that remains is that of the competitive equilibrium. Thus, 
Smith’s theoretical insight was confirmed by the analysis of mathematical economists and 
game theorists during the 1960s and ‘70siii.        
The invisible hand 
Modern economics can be thought of as divided into two main branches, positive and 
normative economics, the former being concerned with descriptive analysis of how the 
economy works, the latter with evaluation of its performance. Smith’s theory of competition 
as outlined above clearly belongs to the branch of positive economics. Equally clearly, the 
most famous of all his ideas, his theory of the invisible hand, belongs to normative 
economics. His central statement of the idea is the following: 
“Every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of society as great 
as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the publick interest, nor 
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knows how much he is promoting it. … He intends only his own gain, and he is in 
this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no 
part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for society that it was no part of it. By 
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually 
than when he really intends to promote it.” (WN, p. 456.) 
The context in which this quotation appears has caused some difficulties to interpreters of 
Smith who are sympathetic to the thought that the private pursuit of self-interest is beneficial 
to societyiv. In fact, the passage appears not as part of a general discourse on the benefits of 
markets but in a much more specific discussion of the benefits of home versus foreign 
investment. However, there are in fact a number of similar statements in the Wealth of 
Nations that justify the common interpretation that Smith thought that markets and 
competition were beneficial to the public interest. But this proposition also raises a number of 
questions. One concerns the nature of the competition that is supposed to have these 
beneficial effects. Another is the more precise meaning to be attached to the concept of the 
public interest in order for the statement to be meaningful. These questions are so central for 
one’s understanding of the market economy that they have engaged the efforts of theoretical 
economists ever since. 
Regarding the nature of competition it seems clear that Smith’s minimum requirement for 
markets to work in the public interest was the absence of monopoly. This again was based on 
the assumption of free entry, meaning that anyone could establish a business if a particular 
industry were to offer a more than normal return on the resources invested. But as the 
example of the number of grocers in a town shows, competition works better if there are many 
producers. This provides a check to private efforts to limit competition, and the benefits of the 
system of perfect liberty may accordingly be realized.  
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A more intriguing question is raised by Smith’s notion of the public interest. His claim is that 
private entrepreneurs who move their capital from declining to expanding industries act in the 
interests of society. But this process inevitably means that some individuals, e.g. the workers 
in the declining industries, lose while others gain. How can we decide whether there is a net 
gain to society? In his invisible hand statement, Smith refers to the annual revenue of society 
or the national income, as we would say today. This indicates that society gains if the winners 
in the process of structural change gain more that the losers lose. But this is not an entirely 
convincing argument. Suppose that those who gain are already well off while the losers live in 
poverty. Would we not in this case hesitate to say that the invisible hand of the market works 
in the interests of society? And if so, what principles should guide our aggregation of 
individual interests into a measure of the interest of society as a whole?v 
There are several indications in the text of the Wealth of Nations that Smith would indeed 
attach greater weight to the losses of the poor than to the gains of the rich. A reasonable 
interpretation of his postulate that competition works in the interests of society is that in the 
long run, everyone would benefit from living in a wealthy society. This interpretation receives 
support from another use that Smith makes of the metaphor of the invisible hand. This occurs 
in the other of his two major works, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS), which was first 
published in 1759vi. There he makes the claim that the rich, without intending to do so, 
promote the interests of the poor. Although the sole end of the rich in employing the poor  
“[is] the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the 
poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make 
nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, 
had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus 
without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society.” (TMS, 
pp. 184-185.) 
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Here the term “the interest of society” obviously refers to all of its members, rich and poor 
included. The reference to the equal proportions of the earth is not easy to interpret, but in any 
case the claim is clearly that the rich provide for the necessaries of life that the poor need, 
although the result is not that there is any complete equalization of the standard of living. 
The reasonable conclusion to draw from Smith’s references to the invisible hand as well as 
from other related passages in his books is that the market economy tends to generate a 
maximum of “the general revenue of society” or the national income. However, there is no 
guarantee that the distribution of this income will turn out to be fair or equitable, even if one 
admits that fair and equitable are concepts of which there are no generally accepted 
definitions. 
With his notion of the invisible hand Adam Smith may be regarded as having founded modern 
normative economics. The claim that the market mechanism tended to promote the public 
interest led later generations of economists to explore both the concept of competitive markets 
and measures of the public interest in order to discover the conditions under which Smith’s 
claim could be justified in more precise analytical terms. The part of economic theory that 
embodies the results of these explorations is known as welfare economics, and the core of the 
theory is the establishment of an equivalence between a competitive equilibrium and what is 
known as a Pareto optimum A competitive equilibrium is a situation where all firms and 
consumers take prices as given in the market and where these prices have adjusted so as to 
bring about equality between demand and supply in all markets. A Pareto optimum – named 
after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto – is essentially a situation where there is no waste 
in the economy: it is impossible to improve the outcome for one individual without making 
somebody else worse off. Consequently, the conclusion is that the market economy under 
ideal conditions generates a situation where there is no waste; society’s resources are used in 
an efficient manner. 
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How are we to judge this conclusion seen in the light of Smith’s original statement? On the 
one hand it marks the results of careful theoretical research that resolves the ambiguities 
contained in the Wealth of Nations regarding the concepts of competition and the public 
interest. On the other hand, it may come as a disappointment to those who have found 
inspiration in Smith’s vision of the market economy as a system working for the common 
good. For Smith’s “system of perfect liberty” modern theorists have substituted a notion of 
perfect competition which is so abstract and stylized that it is hardly recognizable as a 
representation of actual marketsvii. And instead of the public interest they have introduced the 
concept of Pareto optimality that avoids the troublesome aggregation of individual interests 
but at the cost that hardly any institutional or political reform can unequivocally be said to be 
in the interest of society as a whole. 
However, when it comes to the practical applications of economic theory to issues of 
economic policy, many modern economists would probably adopt a position that is in fact not 
very far from that of Smith. While acknowledging the result of economic theory that 
efficiency will only result when competition is “perfect”, they would be inclined to believe 
that actual markets, if reasonably free from unwarranted public regulations and private 
restraints on competition might in fact offer good approximations to the theoretical ideal. And 
regarding the public interest, many would subscribe to the opinion that such a system of free 
markets would be the best guarantee for an economic and social development that in the long 
run would benefit all classes in society. They would probably also emphasize that this 
conclusion hinges not on the analysis of the market system alone but also on the nature of the 
coexistence between markets and government. This is another topic to which Smith 
contributed important insights.           
The role of the state 
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For a long time a common interpretation of Adam Smith’s economics was that he was a 
propagandist for laissez-faire, i.e. for the view that the best policy was to leave the economy 
to the free play of market forces. It also seemed to follow from this interpretation that the state 
– at least with respect to its role in the economy - should be as small as possible. To some 
extent, this reading of the Wealth of Nations was inspired by Smith’s polemics against the 
contemporary view of economic policy which he called mercantilism and which was based on 
detailed economic regulation of the market mechanism. However, when one takes a broader 
view of his work and distinguishes between his polemics and his theoretical perspectives on 
the relationship between markets and government, between the roles of the private and public 
sectors, a more balanced view emerges. 
One important role of the government, according to Smith, was to provide the institutional 
framework required for competitive markets to function. A legal system that provided a 
secure framework for private contracts was essential for the market system to work 
efficiently. More broadly, the role of the state was to protect the members of society, both as 
participants in market transactions and in their private lives, from violence and invasion from 
other societies and oppression by other members of society.  As we have seen, Smith also 
acknowledged that, although well-functioning markets were good for society, individual 
producers might well find it in their individual interests to limit competition by entering into 
“conspiracies against the publick”. Therefore, an important role for government was to design 
an economic system that as far as possible discouraged the creation of private cartels and 
monopolies. 
A further role of the state is to provide goods and services for which the market system does 
not provide the right incentives for private producers to supply them. Such goods are known 
in modern economics as public goods, and in regard to these Adam Smith argues that the role 
of the state consists in  
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“erecting and maintaining certain publick works and certain publick institutions which 
it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to 
erect and maintain; because the profit would never repay the expence to any individual 
or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it 
to a great society.” (WN, pp. 687-688.) 
Just as in the modern theory of public goods, Smith’s emphasis is on the failure of private 
incentives when it comes to providing public goods at the efficient levelviii. The individual 
producer of a public good will compare his private cost with his private benefit, but he does 
not take into account the benefits that accrue to other individuals; hence he underestimates the 
total benefit to society, and too little of these goods will be provided in a pure market 
economy. In the language of modern economics these are cases of market failure. The 
economic agent that can overcome these failures is the government; thus we are presented 
with another positive argument for the role of the state in the economic system. It is together 
with a well-functioning state that the case for a competitive market system is strongest. Smith 
also provides a number of examples from different areas of the economy that illustrate the 
application of this general principle. 
Another contribution that Smith makes to the economics of the public sector comes in his 
analysis of taxation. Taxes are required to finance the provision of public goods and services. 
But the form of taxation is a matter for public concern since taxes can be more or less harmful 
for the efficient performance of the private sector. In the design of the overall system of 
taxation, Smith argues, account should be taken of some general principles that relate both to 
the equity and efficiency of taxation. Regarding equity he argues that 
“[the] subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the 
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in 
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proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the 
state.” (WN, p. 825.) 
While later economists drew a distinction between taxation according to ability to pay and to 
benefits received, in Adam Smith’s thought there appears to be no conflict between the two 
principles. The individual’s income is both a measure of his ability to pay taxes and of the 
benefits that he receives from the government. The larger is his income, the greater are the 
benefits that he receives from a safe environment for his economic activities. 
Regarding the efficiency of the tax system, Smith’s main proposition is that 
“every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets 
of the people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into the publick 
treasury of the state.” (WN, p. 826.) 
What is the difference between the amount of taxes paid by the people and that received by 
the state? Smith’s statement can be given both a narrow and a broad interpretation. In the 
narrow interpretation, the difference is simply the costs of tax collection, such as the salaries 
of the tax inspectors. But in a broader perspective, the costs of taxation should also be taken to 
include the inefficiencies that arise in the private sector because taxes have adverse effects on 
individual incentives to work, save and invest. It is clear from the context that Smith had the 
broader interpretation in mind, and that his thoughts regarding these issues therefore point 
forward to modern discussions of the social costs of taxation where the cost of these 
inefficiencies are taken into account in cost-benefit analysis of public projects.  
The economic system as an engine of growth 
The very title of the Wealth of Nations suggests that the main topic of the book is economic 
growth. But for the modern economist who has been taught economic growth in terms of a 
series of specialized models of an expanding economy, reading the book may actually be a 
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puzzling experience, since he may easily conclude that there are hardly any chapters that are 
explicitly concerned with economic growth, at least not according to modern notions of what 
growth is about. 
However, the modern reader has to adopt a different perspective on growth than the one he 
has been taught in current textbooks, in which economic growth is typically studied in terms 
of a few macroeconomic aggregates such as saving, investment and technical progress, and 
with few references to markets and institutionsix. Smith does acknowledge the importance of 
capital accumulation for economic progress. But it must also be kept in mind that he saw his 
theory of the market mechanism and the invisible hand as an integral part of a theory of social 
and economic progress. Institutional and political reforms that made markets function more 
efficiently meant that the return on capital investment for society as a whole would become 
higher; consequently, national income would expand. Well-functioning markets, free 
international trade and a wisely designed public sector were all elements that would contribute 
to economic growth. However, in the long run there must clearly be a limit to how much 
growth can be achieved through institutional and political reform without increasing the 
amount of productive resources in the economy. 
In a prominent place in the introductory chapter of the Wealth of Nations Adam Smith 
discusses the division of labor, and the example that he uses for this purpose is that of a pin 
factory. The production of a pin is a complicated task, and a single worker with little 
experience would find it a demanding task to produce a single pin in the course of a day’s 
work. But in the pin factory where the production of pins has been broken down into a 
number of separate operations, specialized workers are able to produce several thousand times 
as many pins as an individual worker could do if operating on his own. So division of labor is 
an important source of productivity growth and economic development. 
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The question then becomes: What determines the extent of division of labor? Smith’s famous 
answer was that the division of labor is determined by the extent of the market. In the thinly 
populated regions of the Scottish highlands, every farmer has to be his own slaughterer, baker 
and blacksmith. With increasing density of population the conditions for division of labor 
improves, and society is able to reap the benefits from the use of more efficient technologies. 
This theory of economic progress also throws an interesting light on Smith’s price theory. As 
noted above, this was essentially a cost theory; natural prices were determined by the cost of 
production, independent of demand. But the theory has to be modified to take account of the 
gains from the division of labor. An expanding market will improve the scope for 
specialization in industrial production, so that there is a feedback on costs from the demand 
side. Production will expand, and goods – especially industrial products – can be provided at 
lower prices.  
This is of course not the whole story of economic growth according to Smith. Workers, both 
in pin factories and in other sectors of the economy, cannot exploit more specialized 
technologies without having more real capital available to assist them. The source of real 
capital accumulation is individual saving. Savers will both invest in real capital on their own 
and lend to others who in turn will make capital investments. Together with population 
growth, the accumulation of capital leads to more division of labor and thereby to improved 
productivity and increasing prosperity. 
Perspectives 
In 1971 Kenneth Bouldingx posed the interesting question “After Samuelson, who needs 
Adam Smith?” No doubt, some will find the question provocative because it seems obvious to 
them that we need to be acquainted with the work of one of the greatest economists in history, 
just like philosophers need to study the work of Smith’s great contemporary and friend David 
Hume. Others may react differently, arguing that all that is of lasting value in Smith’s work 
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has been incorporated into modern economics, which – unlike philosophy - is a cumulative 
science, built up by gradually substituting better theories and more substantive empirical 
knowledge for the less solid insights of the economists of earlier centuries. Who is right? 
It is impossible to argue that there is not much truth in the view of economics as a cumulative 
science. Moreover, it is a fact of life that there are many contemporary economists who do 
excellent work in research, teaching, public administration and private business with only a 
very superficial knowledge of the contributions of Adam Smith and the other great figures in 
the history of economics. Indeed, the time may come when modern economists no longer 
have much first hand acquaintance with the work of Paul Samuelson, a giant of economics in 
the 20th century, whom Boulding used as the embodiment of modern economics as seen from 
the perspective of 1971. For someone who aspires to be a leading economist in the 21st 
century or to acquire a good understanding of the frontiers of economic knowledge, reading 
Adam Smith is no substitute for studying contemporary textbooks and journal articles. But in 
the economic theory of consumption, goods are classified as substitutes and complements; 
two goods are complements if the consumption of one increases the benefits from consuming 
the other. Perhaps this is a fruitful way to regard the study of the history of economic thought 
in general and Adam Smith in particular: It increases the benefits from learning modern 
economics. 
These increased benefits are of several kinds. On the one hand, it is instructive to see how 
Smith develops concepts and ideas that still form central elements of contemporary 
economics. In witnessing this early struggle to formulate a consistent theoretical framework 
for the study of economic life, we learn how ideas and abstractions that we now take for 
granted were once problems at the research frontier of economics. 
During the almost two and a half centuries that have passed since the publication of the 
Wealth of Nations economics has become a very different discipline. Theories of markets and 
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competition, of the invisible hand and economic growth have been reformulated in terms of 
mathematical models, and the study of empirical data utilizes advanced statistical methods. A 
modern economist who wishes to be at the top of his subject needs to master the new 
analytical tools. But the mastery of techniques is not sufficient to make a good economist. He 
or she must also be able to develop a more intuitive grasp of the connection between the 
abstract models and the real economy. In this respect Adam Smith is still a good role model. 
Of course, the society that was his frame of reference is a very different one from today’s 
world. But his combination of theoretical analysis and broad perspectives on history, 
institutions and politics is still capable of inspiring his colleagues in the 21st century. 
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04/13 February, Sissel Jensen, Ola Kvaløy, Trond E. Olsen, and Lars Sørgard, 
“Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher 
overcharge”. 
 
05/13 February, Alexander W. Cappelen, Trond Halvorsen, Erik Ø. Sørensen, and 
Bertil Tungodden, “Face-saving or fair-minded: What motivates moral 
behavior?” 
 
06/13 March, Jan Tore Klovland and Lars Fredrik Øksendal, “The decentralised 
central bank: regional bank rate autonomy in Norway, 1850-1892”. 
 
07/13 March, Kurt Richard Brekke, Dag Morten Dalen, and Tor Helge Holmås, 
“Diffusion of Pharmaceuticals: Cross-Country Evidence of Anti-TNF drugs”. 
 
08/13 April, Kurt R. Brekke, Luigi Siciliani, and Odd Rune Straume, “Hospital 
Mergers:A Spatial Competition Approach”. 
 
09/13 April, Liam Brunt and Edmund Cannon, “The truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth: the English Corn Returns as a data source in economic 
history, 1770-1914”. 
 
10/13 April, Alexander W. Cappelen, Bjørn-Atle Reme, Erik Ø. Sørensen, and 
Bertil Tungodden, “Leadership and incentives”. 
 
11/13 April, Erling Barth, Alexander W. Cappelen, and Tone Ognedal, “Fair Tax 
Evasion”. 
 
12/13 June, Liam Brunt and Edmund Cannon, “Integration in the English wheat 
market 1770-1820”. 
 
13/13 June, Fred Schroyen and Nicolas Treich, “The Power of Money: Wealth 
Effects in Contests”. 
 
14/13 August, Tunç Durmaz and Fred Schroyen, “Evaluating Carbon Capture and 
Storage in a Climate Model with Directed Technical Change”. 
 
15/13 September, Agnar Sandmo, “The Principal Problem in Political Economy: 
Income Distribution in the History of Economic Thought”. 
 
16/13 October, Kai Liu, “Health Insurance Coverage for Low-income Households: 
Consumption Smoothing and Investment”. 
 
17/13 December, Øivind A. Nilsen, Lars Sørgard, and Simen A. Ulsaker, 
“Upstream Merger in a Successive Oligopoly: Who Pays the Price?” 
 
18/13 December, Erling Steigum and Øystein Thøgersen, “A crisis not wasted – 
Institutional and structural reforms behind Norway’s strong macroeconomic 
performance”. 
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01/14 January, Kurt R. Brekke, Tor Helge Holmås, and Odd Rune Straume, “Price 
Regulation and Parallel Imports of Pharmaceuticals”. 
 
02/14 January, Alexander W. Cappelen, Bjørn-Atle Reme, Erik Ø. Sørensen, and 
Bertil Tungodden, “Leadership and incentives”. 
 
03/14 January, Ingvild Almås, Alexander W. Cappelen, Kjell G. Salvanes, Erik Ø. 
Sørensen, and Bertil Tungodden, “Willingness to Compete: Family Matters”. 
 
04/14 February, Kurt R. Brekke, Luigi Siciliani, and Odd Runde Straume, 
“Horizontal Mergers and Product Quality”. 
 
05/14 March, Jan Tore Klovland, “Challenges for the construction of historical price 
indices: The case of Norway, 1777-1920”. 
 
06/14 March, Johanna Möllerström, Bjørn-Atle Reme, and Erik Ø. Sørensen, “Luck, 
Choice and Responsibility”. 
 
07/14 March, Andreea Cosnita-Langlais and Lars Sørgard, “Enforcement vs 
Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare?” 
 
08/14 March, Alexander W. Cappelen, Shachar Kariv, Erik Ø. Sørensen, and Bertil 
Tungodden, «Is There a Development Gap in Rationality?” 
 
09/14 April, Alexander W. Cappelen, Ulrik H. Nielsen, Bertil Tungodden, Jean-
Robert Tyran, and Erik Wengström, “Fairness is intuitive”. 
 
10/14 April, Agnar Sandmo, “The early history of environmental economics”. 
 
11/14 April, Astrid Kunze, “Are all of the good men fathers? The effect of having 
children on earnings”. 
 
12/14 April, Agnar Sandmo, “The Market in Economics: Behavioural Assumptions 
and Value Judgments”. 
 
13/14 April, Agnar Sandmo, “Adam Smith and modern economics”. 
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